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In the last years, with the occurence of many financial banking crises 
worldwide, bank credit risk has been a focus of the market. This thesis aims to 
analyse whether depositants do care about bank credit risk when they allocate 
their deposits in commercial banks or not. The literature rarely focuses on this 
crucial relationship between bank credit risk and deposit demand. 
In order to further develop this topic, a demand model was defined and 
estimated applying the characteristic methodology and using multinomial logit 
and nested multinomial logit specifications. Many bank observed characteristics 
were included, such as deposit interest rate, service fees, number of branches, 
number of employees, bank size and bank credit risk. 
Using a sample of US commercial banks between 2009 and 2015, findings 
suggest that depositors react to deposit interest rates and bank size in a positive 
and statistically significant way when choosing a bank. In addition to that, 
consumers do care about banks geographic diversification, but they do not 
consider bank credit risk in a statistically significant way, when deciding their 
deposits allocation. 
 





Nos últimos anos, com a ocorrência de várias crises bancárias por todo o 
mundo, o risco de crédito dos bancos tornou-se um foco para o mercado. Este 
Trabalho Final de Mestrado tem como objetivo analisar se os depositantes têm 
em consideração o risco de crédito dos bancos quando decidem alocar os seus 
depósitos. De facto, este tópico raramente é o foco da análise de pesquisas no 
setor bancário, que apresentam poucas conclusões neste âmbito. 
Com vista ao desenvolvimento deste trabalho, um modelo de procura de 
depósitos foi definido e estimado, aplicando a metodologia das características e 
especificações multinomial logit e nested multinomial logit. Várias características 
observáveis dos bancos foram incluídas na nossa análise, como por exemplo a 
taxa de juro de depósitos, comissões de serviço, número de balcões, número de 
empregados, tamanho do banco e risco de crédito. 
Tendo por base a análise de bancos comerciais americanos entre os anos 
2009 e 2015, as conclusões sugerem que os depositantes reagem à taxa de juro dos 
depósitos e ao tamanho do banco de uma forma positiva e estatisticamente 
significativa. Para além disso, os depositantes também têm em consideração a 
diversificação geográfica dos bancos, mas não reagem ao risco de crédito de uma 
forma estatisticamente significativa, no momento de alocar os seus depósitos. 
 
Palavras-chave: Risco de crédito, Depositantes, Estimação da procura, Procura 




Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. iii 
Abstract....................................................................................................................... v 
Resumo ..................................................................................................................... vii 
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................... ix 
Index of tables............................................................................................................ x 
Index of figures.......................................................................................................... x 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 12 
2. Literature Review.......................................................................................... 14 
2.1. Demand estimation – econometrics review ....................................... 14 
2.2. Empirical studies on deposits demand models................................. 16 
2.3. Bank credit risk....................................................................................... 16 
3. Empirical framework and model................................................................ 21 
3.1. Model Definition .................................................................................... 22 
3.1.1. Multinomial Logit Demand Model ................................................. 22 
3.1.2. Nested Multinomial Logit Demand Model.................................... 24 
3.2. Model Estimation ................................................................................... 25 
3.2.1. Multinomial Logit Demand Model ................................................. 25 
3.2.2. Nested Logit Multinomial Demand Model.................................... 26 
4. Data and variables ........................................................................................ 28 
4.1. Heterogeneity and product differentiation........................................ 28 
4.2. Market and outside option definition................................................. 30 
4.3. Groups ..................................................................................................... 31 
4.4. Endogeneity and instrumental variables ........................................... 32 
4.5. Summary statistics ................................................................................. 33 
4.6. Preliminary analysis of the impact of bank credit risk ..................... 34 
 x 
5. Results ............................................................................................................. 36 
5.1. OLS regressions...................................................................................... 37 




Index of tables 
Table 1: Summary statistics. .................................................................................. 34 
Table 2: Estimation results. Note: The results were estimated using 338 
observations. Clustered (by year) standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes 
significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.
 ........................................................................................................................................ 37 
Index of figures 
Figure 1: Bank rating methodology. (source: Moody’s Investors Services, 1999)
 ........................................................................................................................................ 19 
Figure 2: Average market share depending on the value of the bank credit risk 










In the last years, with the occurence of various financial banking crises 
worldwide, bank credit risk has been a focus of market participants. Between 
2009 and 2016, 491 in the US and 4 in Portugal collapsed, resulting in large losses 
for depositors, investors and shareholders. For example, and only considering 
2009 data, 8.14 million dollars were lost by depositors, as a consequence of the 
failure of Silverton Bank, New Frontier Bank, Community Bank of Nevada and 
First Bank of Beverly Hills, in the US. In Portugal, and only considering the 
collapse of Banco Privado Português, depositors lost an estimated value around 
700 million euros (Diário de Notícias, 2010). Is, therefore, challenging and crucial 
to measure credit risk in banking environment.  
In this context, this thesis proposes to analyse whether the allocation of 
deposits by investors and other market participants in commercial banks 
responds to bank credit risk or not. In other words, it aims to assess if depositors 
actually consider credit risk in their deposit decision-making process. The 
literature is very scarce on this topic, with few studies considering the impact of 
bank credit risk on the demand of deposits as the main focus. 
In the US, deposits in insured banks are insured by Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation up to $250,000. As a consequence, it is expected that consumers that 
allocate their deposits (up to $250,000) in insured banks do not take into 
consideration bank credit risk. However, the question remains whether the 
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remaining depositors (more than $250,000 in insured banks and independent ly 
of the amount in not insured banks) do respond to credit risk. 
To examine this research question, I proposed a quantitative approach 
through the estimation of a demand model for deposits, applying the 
characteristic methodology and using multinomial logit and nested multinomial 
logit specifications. Therefore, banks are considered as a set of observed and 
unobserved characteristcs. I included deposit interest rates, service fees, the 
number of branches, the number of employees and bank size as explanatory 
variables. In addition to that, a variable related with bank credit risk is also used, 
so that it is possible to capture the impact of bank credit risk on deposit demand.  
According to the estimation results of the most flexible and consistent deposit 
demand specification, depositors respond, in a statistically significant way, to 
deposit interest rates and bank size. However, they do not react, in a statistically 
significant way, to bank credit risk when allocating their deposits in commercial 
banks. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2, the literature review, has an 
econometric overview of demand models, presents previous empirical studies 
on this field and discusses bank credit risk and its measures. Chapter 3 defines 
the demand model as well as the estimation procedure. In chapter 4, data is 









2.1 Demand estimation – econometrics review 
Demand estimation is in the basis of several empirical studies that examine a 
wide range of economic topics, from market power to innovation, mergers and 
the impact of pricing and non-pricing strategies. 
In fact, when choosing a demand model specification, two main concerns 
must be addressed. First, it must be flexible, in the sense that the selected 
functional form does not impose restrictions in the data in what concerns 
substitution patterns. Second, it must be consistent with the economic theory. 
Early work has been done in this field, for example the linear expenditure model, 
the Rotterdam model, the translog model and the almost ideal demand system. 
Even if we define a flexible and consistent demand model, some problems most 
be solved regarding its estimation: dimensionality problems that are related with 
large number of parameters to be estimated; empirical problems, specially 
concerning the use of instrumental variables to face endogenous prices, and 
unrealistic assumptions, in particular on the distribution of income and types 
across consumers. Thus, the literature presented demand systems in product 
space and demand systems in characteristic space as solutions for the mentioned 
problems. 
The multi-stage demand approach in product space assumes that we can 
divide consumer’s decision problem in separate but related stages (top stage, 
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middle stage and lower stage) by splitting products into smaller groups, being 
products within a group better substitutes to each other than products from 
different groups. Although this approach allows to solve the dimensiona lity 
problem while relying on flexible functional forms, the lower stage can not be 
estimated for datasets with entry and exit of products, in other words, in this case 
the procedure is not consistent with economic theory. 
Considering products as a set of observed and unobserved characteristics, 
demand systems in characteristic space solve some of the mentioned problems. 
Following a discrete choice demand approach, each consumer evaluate whether 
to buy at most one unit of a product within the inside options or spend the 
resources in an alternative outside option. The multinomial logit demand model 
(MNL), although allowing for a large number of dimensions related with 
consumer heterogeneity and having an analytical demand function, makes 
assumptions that have strong implications. In particular, it imposes restrictive 
substitution patterns, as own and cross-price elasticities depend only on the price 
and market share of the product whose price is being altered and not by how 
similar the products are. For example, if we introduce an irrelevant alternative, 
we expect the new product to have little impact but the MNL model does not fit 
with this intuition. While it maintains an analytical demand function, the nested 
multinomial logit model (NMNL) reduces some of the previous concerns by 
integrating a two-stages decision-making process, first choosing which group of 
products to buy from and, then, deciding between the products of the group. By 
allowing consumer preferences to be correlated within product groups, the 
NMNL substitution patterns are more flexible as products that belong to the 
same group have different substitution patterns from products that belong to 
different groups. However, cross-price elasticities must take one of two values 
whether the products belong to the same group or not, being restrictive. 
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Although there are demand models whose implied substitution patterns are 
more realistic and flexible, they imply complex estimation procedures. 
2.2 Empirical studies on deposits demand models 
Applying the refered demand models approaches, several authors conducted 
empirical researches on pertinent economic topics through the specification of 
deposit demand models. 
Molnar, Violi and Zhou (2013) analyses the competition on the deposit side 
between italian retail banks, in other words, they examine whether competition 
is valuable or harmful and risky. For this purpose, the authors applied a 
structural demand model for deposit services. Considering the retail banking 
industry as a differentiated product market, banks are differentiated by their 
observed and unobserved characteristics. Adopting the NMNL model to 
estimate the demand function, Molnar, Violin and Zhou (2013) used the net 
deposit interest rate (average deposit interest rate – average service rate), the 
number of branches in the market, the number of regions where the bank has 
presence and the age of the bank as observed characteristics. Logarithm of both 
the number of regions and branches were included in order to capture their 
declining effect on demand for deposits. Regarding the nested logit models, two 
different specifications were included: first, classification of banks into one group 
and, then, into two groups. Banks were classified into two groups following this 
criterion: national banks – banks that cover at least 16 regions – and local banks 
– banks that cover less than 16 regions. OLS and IV estimation methods were 
applied jointly with fixed effects for regions and years across the several model 
specifications. The instruments included the ratio of total costs to total assets, 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets, ratio of bad loans to total assets, exogenous 
bank characteristics, such as the number of regions and the age dummy variable, 
and BLP instrumental variables, that correspond to the characteristics of other 
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banks in the market (for example, the average age of all other rival banks and the 
average of the number of regions where all other banks have at least one branch). 
The sample is from 2003 to 2007, covering 5 years, 20 regions and 105, 104, 103, 
103 and 102 banks, respectively. The results indicated that consumers do respond 
positively and statistically significant to net deposit interest rate and to the 
number of branches. On the other hand, they do not value the number of regions 
where the bank is present and the age of the bank when choosing a bank to 
allocate their deposits. Conclusions also suggest that banks with an extensive 
multi-market contact tend to be less competitive, paying lower deposit rates. 
Dick (2008) proposes a structural deposit demand model for comercial bank 
with the aim of measuring the effects on consumers of the changes that occured 
in bank services due to the 90s’ US branching deregulation. Following a discrete-
choice approach, considering banks as heterogeneous, a set of characteristics 
were included in the MNL and NMNL models: service charges, rate paid on 
deposits, number of local branches per square mile, number of employees per 
branch, bank size, number of states in which the bank has presence and age of 
the bank. In the particular case of the NMNL model, banks were divided into two 
groups based on their geographic diversification: multi-state, operating in more 
than one state and single-state banks, which have presence in a single state. Both 
OLS and IV estimation methods were used jointly with bank, market and state 
fixed effects. In what refers to the choice of instruments, the author included 
market wages, housing price index, city density, expenses on premises and fixed 
assets, market average price of purchased funds, a measure of credit risk – the 
average of non-performing loans –, ratio of equity over assets, the proportion of 
commitment loans and two indicator variables: one for whether the bank 
operates in at least one rural area and other for whether the bank belongs to a 
banking holding company. In addition to those, BLP instruments were also 
included. The sample covers the period between 1993 and 1999 using data on US 
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comercial banks. Consumers seem to react, in a statistically significant way, to 
deposit interest rates and, in a less extent, to service fees. Other characteristics 
that affect the allocation of deposits in a statistically significant way include 
staffing, geographic density of local branches and bank size. Bank geographic 
diversification and age are not statistically significant to depositors. Findings of 
this paper suggested that consumers, if anything, increase their welfare as a 
consequence of the branching deregulation, although it is not possible to 
establish a concrete casual relationship from deregulation to welfare. 
Molnar, Nagy and Horváth (2006) also applied a deposit service demand 
function in order to analyse the degree of competition of credit loan and 
household deposit markets in Hungary. In the specific case of deposit services, 
MNL and NMNL models were used for three sub-markets: demand, short-term 
and long-term deposits. Interest rates paid by banks on deposits, fees on deposits, 
the number of branches, average number of employees in a branch, bank age and 
size were the characteristics considered. In the NMNL model, banks were 
classified into three different groups based on their total assets: large banks, 
medium-size banks and small banks. Only an IV estimation method was 
employed, jointly with time fixed effects. Molnar, Nagy and Horváth (2006) opt 
to choose as instruments a measure of credit risk – average of non-performing 
loans –, capital adequacy ratio, ratio of liquid assets to total assets, operational 
costs per total assets, share of loans per total assets and the average salary per 
capita of other banks in a period in addition to BLP instruments. The sample 
covered monthly data for the period between January of 2003 and December of 
2005. In what concerns demand for deposits, depositors react in a statistically 
significant way positively to the interest rate, number of branches and number of 
employees per branch and in a negatively to service fees. Results of this paper 
suggest that competition in the Hungarian banking sector is low with high price-
cost margins. 
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2.3 Bank credit risk 
Risk measurement is a problematic issue and several methodologies are 
presented in the literature. 
First, bank credit risk can be assessed by rating agencies such as Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch/IBCA. Rating notations normally follow an 
alphanumeric scale to evaluate credit risk. 
In fact, bank ratings are intended to provide investors and other market 
participants with credit information and analysis by measuring the probability 
that a bank will default on its debt obligations and the expected monetary loss 
that if such a default occurs. The bank rating methodology includes several 
financial, environmental and structural analyses which include ownership and 
governance, risk profile and management, operating environment and 
management priorities and strategies. 
 
Figure 1: Bank rating methodology. (source: Moody’s Investors  Services, 1999) 
Second, we have the composite measure of asset risk (Dahl and Shrieves, 
1992). Following some indexes used in previous researches, this measure is based 
on accounting data and is a weighted sum of several asset categories divided by 
total assets. The ratio includes the following components – with the weight of 
each component being given in parantheses: noninterest-bearing balances and 
currency and coin (0.00), interest-bearing balances (0.25),short-term US treasury 
and government agency debt securities (0.10), long-term US government and 
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agency debt securities (0.25), state and local government securities (0.50), bank 
acceptances (0.25), fed funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to 
resell (0.25), standby letters of credit and foreign office guarantees (0.75), loan 
and lease financing commitments (0.25), commercial letters of credit (0.50) and 
all other assets (1.00). However, using this bank credit risk measure implies 
having access to restrictive data and information 
Furthermore, there are some publicly available measures of loan portfolio 
quality. As a core credit risk management tool, the portfolio quality analysis 
focus on past and forecasted portfolio developments. Loan chargeoffs and 
provisions, loan loss allowances, “past due” and “nonaccrual” loan 
classifications try to evaluate loan portfolio quality. However, as these measures 
reflect loan portfolio quality with a lag, they are often biased. In addition to that, 
having some time discretion over these indicators, there is evidence that banks 
make accounting decisions regarding these items in order to minimize regulatory 
costs (Moyer, 1990). 
Finally, and although being considered a measure of loan portfolio quality, 
non-performing loans are less subject to timeliness criticism compared with the 
previous presented indicators. This loan quality index is the ratio of the sum of 
one-half of loans classified as past due 90 days or more and loans classified as 
nonaccrual to total loans. Support for the use of such a measure was developed 
by Meeker and Gray (1987) and Beaver et al. (1989). In fact, the rationale of non-
performing loans is that past due loans have less weight in the predictons of 








Empirical framework and model 
In this section are presented the definition and estimation procedure of the 
demand models of deposit services applying two different approaches: the MNL 
and the NMNL demand models. The choice of these frameworks follows the 
methodology adopted by previous empiral studies on this field, presented in the 
literature review chapter, specially Dick (2008), Molnar, Nagy and Horváth 
(2006) and Molnar, Violi and Zhou (2013). Furthermore, the particularties of our 
sample justify this approach. First, we have entry and exit of banks across the 
year, so a model in product space could not be applied. In addition to that, the 
number of banks is big, resulting in a dimensionality problem that is solved 
through the use of the charachteristic approach. The choosen models present 
analytical demand functions that do not imply complex estimation procedures. 
These demand models are derived following the discrete choice literature. It 
is assumed that consumers have already decided the proportion of assets they 
are going to allocate to deposit services, in other words their savings problems, 
and they only have to choose a bank. As switching costs and fixed costs are 
significant, it is a realistic assumption to state that consumers choose a single 




3.1 Model definition 
3.1.1 Multinomial Logit Demand Model 
Considering a MNL demand specification for deposit services and assuming 
that there are i=1, …,𝐼𝑡 consumers interested in purchasing deposit services from 
a bank, j=0,1, …, 𝐽𝑡 banks (j=0 indicates the outside option) and t=1, …, T time 
periods, the conditional indirect utility of consumer i from choosing bank j’s 
services in year t is: 
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼
𝑑 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑑 + 𝛼𝑠 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑠 𝛼𝑠 + 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 
where 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the conditional indirect utility of consumer i from choosing bank j’s 
services in year t, 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 is a credit risk variable of bank j in year t, 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑑  represents 
the interest rate paid on deposits of bank j in year t, 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑠  represents the service fees 
on checking accounts of bank j in year t, 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′  is a K dimensional vector of observed 
characteristics other than interest rates of bank j in year t, 𝜉𝑗𝑡  represents the 
unobserved bank characteristics to the econometrician of bank j (included as a 
mean across consumers) and 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a random disturbance with zero mean, 
identically and independently distributed (i.i.d) across consumers, banks and 
time periods. The K+3 dimensional vector 𝜃𝐷 = (𝜆, 𝛼
𝑑 ,𝛼𝑠 , 𝛽) denotes the taste 
parameters to be estimated.  𝛿𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼
𝑑𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑑 + 𝛼𝑠 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑠 𝛼𝑠 + 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡  is the 
mean utility across consumers of bank j in year t. In fact, we can note that the 
parameters of the utility function do not depend on individual i’s characteristics 
and the variation in consumers’ taste enter only through the additive term 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 . 
Therefore, consumer i will choose bank j whenever it gives the highest utility, i.e. 
𝑈(𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 , 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑑 , 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑠 , 𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝜉𝑗𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; 𝜃𝐷) ≥ 𝑈(𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑙𝑡 , 𝑝𝑙𝑡
𝑑 ,𝑝𝑙𝑡
𝑠 ,𝑥𝑙𝑡 , 𝜉𝑙𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖𝑙𝑡; 𝜃𝐷)  for all l ≠ j, 
where 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡  and 𝜖𝑖𝑙𝑡  capture consumer specific terms not observed by the 
econometrician. By assuming that the consumer heterogeneity term, 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 , is i.i.d 
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across banks, consumers and time periods and has a standard type I extreme 












where 𝑞𝑗𝑡  is the aggregate demand of bank j in year t, in this case the total 
deposits of bank j in year t, 𝑆𝑡 is the market size measure in year t, which, for 
example, can be defined as the number of consumers or total deposits. 𝛿𝑡 =
(𝛿0𝑡 ,𝛿1𝑡 ,… , 𝛿𝐽𝑡) is a vector of the mean utilities across consumers. Furthermore, 
this demand model can be established in terms of market shares and, as a 









where 𝑠𝑗𝑡 is the market share of bank j in year t and ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝐽𝑡
𝑗=0 (𝛿𝑗) = 1. 
In what concerns the implied substitution patterns of this model, for example the 


















𝑑 𝑠𝑘𝑡(𝛿𝑡)  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘 
where 𝜂𝑗𝑗𝑡  refers to the own-deposit interest rate elasticity of bank j in year t and 
𝜂𝑗𝑘𝑡  refers to the cross-deposit interest rate elasticity between bank j and k in year 
t. We can note that the MNL model imposes unrealistic substitution patters, 
specially concerning cross-deposit interest rate elasticities as they are entirely 
determined by the parameter 𝛼𝑑 , the market share and deposit interest rate of 
the bank whose deposit interest rate is changing, not considering how good 
substitutes banks are and similar in terms of characteristics. 
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3.1.2 Nested Multinomial Logit Demand Model 
The MNL demand model imposes restrictive substitution patterns, which are 
not consistent with economic theory. Therefore, the NMNL model reduces this 
limitation, maintaining a simple and analytical demand function, by requiring an 
a priori grouping of banks into G+1 exhaustive and mutually exclusive sets, 
including the outside good 
Following this model, the conditional indirect utility function of consumer i from 
choosing bank j’s deposit services in year t takes the following form: 
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼
𝑑 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑑 + 𝛼𝑠 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑠 + 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + {𝜍𝑖𝑔𝑡 + (1 − 𝜎)𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 } 
where 𝜍𝑖𝑔𝑡  represents consumer i utility, common to all banks belonging to group 
g, in year t and 𝜎 is an unknown parameter that is restricted to 𝜎 ∈ [0,1[ in order 
to be consistent with the economic theory. By including the term 𝜍𝑖𝑔𝑡, this model 
introduces a correlation in the preferences of each consumer across banks within 
a group. 𝜍𝑖𝑔𝑡 has a distribution that depends on 𝜎, meaning that if 𝜎 converges to 
one, then increases the relative weight on 𝜍𝑖𝑔𝑡  and, therefore, the correlation 
between tastes of banks within a group. On the other hand, if 𝜎 converges to zero, 
the NMNL model approaches the MNL model, previously presented. As proved 
by Cardell (1997), if 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a type I extreme value random variable, so it is {𝜍𝑖𝑔𝑡 +
(1 − 𝜎)𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 }. This assumption produces an analytical expression for the aggregate 











where 𝐷𝑔𝑡 = ∑ 𝑒
𝛿𝑘𝑡
(1−𝜎)
𝑘 ∈𝑔  and refers to the inclusive value term of group g in year 
















For example, the own- and cross-deposit interest rate elasticities implied by the 















𝑠𝑗𝑡 𝑔⁄ (𝛿𝑡)] 











𝑠𝑘𝑡 𝑔⁄ (𝛿𝑡)]  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗,𝑘 ∈ 𝑔 








𝑑 𝑠𝑘𝑡(𝛿𝑡)  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 ∈ 𝑔, 𝑘 ∉ 𝑔 
where 𝑠𝑗𝑡 𝑔⁄  is the within group market share of bank j belonging to group g in 
year t, in other words, the market share of bank j, which belongs to group g, as a 
fraction of the total group share 𝑠𝑔𝑡 . 
In fact, the substitution patterns are now much more flexible than the ones 
proposed by the MNL model due to the fact that now we have different cross-
price elasticities depending on whether banks belong to the same group or not. 
However, the cross-deposit interest rates elasticities still do not depend on bank 
j, which remain restrictive. 
3.2 Model Estimation 
3.2.1 Multinomial Logit Demand Model 
Following Berry (1994) approach, by matching the predicted market shares to 
the observed ones and normalizing the mean utility of the outsider option to zero, 
so that 𝑒𝛿0𝑡 = 1, we can derive the equation to estimate the logit model. 
First, the MNL predicted market share of bank j in year t should be set exactly to 




∗  is the observed market share of bank j in year t. Then, dividing the 










and as 𝑒𝛿0 = 1, due to normalization procedures, the market share of the outside 





























Applying the logarithm of the above equation we get: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗𝑡
∗ ) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑠0𝑡
∗ ) = 𝛿𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼
𝑑 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑑 + 𝛼𝑠 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑠 𝛼𝑠 + 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 
which is the MNL model expression – a linear equation that can be estimated 
by treating the term 𝜉𝑗𝑡 as the error term. 
3.1.2 Nested Multinomial Logit Demand Model 
Berry (1994) also applied a methodology to estimate the NMNL model. By setting 
the predicted market shares equal to the observed market shares: 
𝑠𝑗𝑡(𝛿𝑡) = 𝑠𝑗𝑡
∗  


















































Applying the logarithm of the above equation, we get: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗𝑡




− 𝜎𝑙𝑛 (𝐷𝑔𝑡) 
which is an expression dependent on the inclusive value term 𝐷𝑔𝑡. As we set the 
predicted market shares equal to the observed market shares, the predicted 
within group market shares will also match the observed ones: 






∗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗 ∈ 𝑔. 
where 𝑠𝑗𝑡/𝑔
∗  represents the observed within group market share of bank j, that 
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Substituting this expression, we have: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗𝑡









and simplifying, we get: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗𝑡
∗ ) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑠0𝑡
∗ ) = 𝛿𝑗𝑡 +  𝜎 𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗𝑡/𝑔




′ 𝛽 + 𝜎𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗𝑡/𝑔
∗ ) + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 
which is the NMNL model expression – a linear equation that can be estimated 
by treating the term 𝜉𝑗𝑡  as the error term. The NMNL is similar to the MNL 









Data and variables 
Balance sheet and income statement data was collected from 
www.usbanklocations.com. The collected data refers to US commercial banks 
and covers the period 2009-2015 (7 years) and data is taken from the last quarter 
of each year. An observation is defined as bank-year combination in the 
estimation exercise. 
 
4.1 Heterogeneity and product differentiation 
In the analysis, we defined deposit services as our product. Thus, it is assumed 
that depositants consider banks heterogeneous, being the differentiating factors 
the characteristics of banks.  
In fact, two different prices are considered: the interest rate paid on deposits 
and service fees and comissions. The deposit interest rate is calculated by the 
ratio of deposit expenses, both domestic and foreign, to the stock of deposits, 
while deposit service charges are calculated by the ratio of deposit revenues from 
fees and commissions to the stock of deposits. Related with service fees, we also 
included a dummy variable that should capture the impact of banks charging 
deposit service fees because, in our sample, some banks do not do that. This 
dichotomous variable whether assumes the value 1 if the bank actually charges 
deposit servisse fees or 0 otherwise. 
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Being sources of heterogeneity, some observed bank characteristics are 
included in our model, starting with the number of branches that should be 
related with banks’ spatial and geographical differentiation. We also used the 
number of employees in order to capture its correlation with waiting time and 
the value of human interaction to depositants. Bank size is another characteristic 
that is controled in our model. Dick (2008) applied three size categories based on 
total assets: small, medium and large.1 However, we found out that, following 
this criterion, all banks in our sample are considered large. Thus, taking into 
consideration total assets, we defined two groups in order to analyse the impact 
of bank size on the demand of deposits: large banks and too big to fail banks. 
According to Labonte (2017), banks with more than 300 billion assets are declared 
too big to fail. This variable toobigtofail is included with the objective of capturing 
features related with larger banks, for exemple bundle of products and services, 
infrastructures and know.  
Bank age was also a characteristic we use through a dummy variable intended 
to measure the impact of reputation, branding, reliability and expertise, by 
dividing banks into two categories: experienced banks, which have activities for 
15 or more years and recent banks, which are established for less than 15 years - 
following Molnar (2013). We also introduced the number of states in which the 
bank has presence, intended to capture the value of network size and geographic 
diversification. However, we have to drop these two characteristics due to 
collinearity problems, as we used bank and year fixed effects in our 
specifications. 
In addition to that, and being the focus of this master thesis, a bank credit risk 
measure is included in our data in order to assess the impact of credit risk on the 
allocation of deposits. Deciding the right measure for bank credit risk was a 
                                                 
1 Banks with total assets between 100 and 300 million are considered medium-sized, while banks with total assets 
above 300 million are considered large. This criterion is defined according to the FFIEC form that banks report to 
the regulatory authority. 
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challenging task. In fact, based on previous empirical analysis, we decide to use 
the ratio of non-performing loans for measuring bank credit risk. This variable is 
calculated by the ratio of non-performing loans, which are calculated by the sum 
of one-half of loans classified as past due 90 days or more and loans classified as 




× 𝑙𝑝𝑑𝑗𝑡 + 𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑡
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡
× 100 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑣𝑗𝑡 is the ratio, in percentage, of non-performing loans of bank j in year 
t, 𝑙𝑝𝑑𝑗𝑡  is a variable that measures loans past due 90 days or more of bank j in 
year t, 𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑡  corresponds to nonaccrual loans of bank j in year t and 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡 
represents total loans of bank j in year t. 
The risk measure I am using, 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡, will be defined as a dummy variable that 
have the value 1 if the ratio of non-performing loans of the bank in that year is 
above the median and the value 0 if that ratio is equal to or under the median. 
4.2 Market and outside option definition 
Defining the relevant market measure is an essential step in our analysis. In 
fact, as we have explained in the previous section, market shares depend on how 
we specify market size. Considering the deposit banking market of the US as a 
whole, the market share of a bank in a year is calculated by the ratio of the bank 
stock of deposits that amounts at the end of the year to the whole market size. 𝑆𝑡, 
the market size in year t, is defined as the sum of the stock of deposits at the end 
of year t of all US commercial banks.  
In what regards the definition of the outside option, Molnar (2006) and Dick 
(2008) considered thrifts and credit unions arguing that these depository 
institutions are likely bank competitors. Although that might be a possible 
definition to the outside option, due to data limitation on these fields, other 
approach was followed. Therefore, our outside option in year t is defined as the 
 31 
sum of the stock of deposits at the end of the year from banks that do not have a 
market share above 0.5% in any of the 7 years of the data sample – this approach 
is also used in Pinkse (2004). 
So, the market share of bank j in year t is calculated by the ratio of the stock of 
deposits, at the end of the year t, of bank j to the stock of deposits of all banks in 
year t. 
Therefore, we have 48 commercial banks in 2009, 49 in 2010 and 2011, 47 in 2012, 
48 in 2013 and 2014 and 49 in 2015. 
4.3 Groups 
To carry the estimation of the nested logit demand model, an a priori grouping 
of banks into groups is required. Following previous empirical studies on this 
field, we used two different criteria.  
On one hand, we divide banks into two groups based on their total assets. The 
first group includes 252 banks with total assets above 300 billion – banks too big 
to fail. In the second group, 86 banks – large banks. 
One the other hand, banks were grouped based on their geographic 
diversification: multi-states banks, operating in more than one state, and single 
state banks, which have presence in a single state. Considering the sample, the 
first group – multi-state banks – has 244 banks and the second group – single 
state banks – has 94 banks. This grouping criterion should insure that differences 
in terms of banks’ geographic presence are included in the model. Therefore, 
single state banks, which do not operate in more than one state, tend to be present 
in a single local market within the state, being considered local banks. Otherwise, 
multi-state banks, which have presence in more than one state, tend to have the 
caractheristic of establishing operations in more than one local market within the 
states. 
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4.4 Endogeneity and instrumental variables 
As discussed before, the term 𝜉𝑗𝑡 is the error term of both the MNL and NMNL 
demand models. In fact, this term has a significant meaning: the unobserved 
characteristics of bank j in year t, including variables such as reputation, credit 
conditions that are not interest rates, advertising and promotions, financial 
soundness and experience. Although they are not observed by the 
econometrician, banks and consumers do observe and react to them. These 
characteristics may also be correlated with prices, which make them endogenous. 
Therefore, the simple OLS estimates can be biased and we should use the 
instrumental variables (IV) estimation method in order to control the 
endogeneity issue. Besides deposit interest rate and service fees, in the NMNL, 
the term 𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗𝑡 𝑔⁄ ) is clearly endogenous and also needs to be instrumented. This 
happens because the within group share is correlated with the prices and, as a 
consequence, with the unobserved characteristics, in other words, the error term. 
With the inclusion of bank fixed effects, which capture the mean valuation of 
banks’ unobserved characteristics across years, and year fixed effects, that 
capture the mean valuation of unobserved characteristics of a given year, the 
error term is now defined as deviations from the mean the mean valuation, which 
includes demand shocks. 
The selected instrumental variables must satisfy two conditions: they need to 
be correlated with the endonegous variables and not correlated with the error 
term. 
Following Dick (2008), the set of instrumental variables includes two parts: 
cost shifters and markup shifters. On one hand, we have the cost shifters, which 
are, by definition, not correlated with demand shocks included in the error term, 
but are correlated with pricing decisions and, therefore, with the endogenous 
variables. The cost shifthers include the degree of a bank capitalization, 
measured by the ratio of equity over assets, the capital adequacy ratio, the ratio 
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of liquid assets to total assets and the share of loans per total asset. In addition to 
that, we use the labour cost per total asset to measure labour costs and, to control 
operating costs, the ratio of expenses on premises and fixed assets to total 
deposits. For the within group market share of a given bank, we use the mean of 
the cost shifters instruments across groups. 
On the other hand, BLP variables were included. These standard variables of 
the discrete choice literature refer to the characteristics of other banks in the same 
year as instruments for prices. The underlying rational of this approach is that 
characteristics other than prices are exogenous and not correlated with the error 
term but correlated with the price of other banks. This happens because banks 
that have close substitutes will have lower markups while other banks will have 
higher prices compared with costs. In the NMNL model specification, 
characteristics of other banks in the group were used as instruments for the 
within market share of a given bank. 
4.5 Summary statistics 




Table 1: Summary statistics.  
Note: The statistics were computed across 338 observations 
 
From Table 1, we can state that the median bank in the median year has 
360 branches, 9946 employees, has a ratio of non-performing loans of 1.309% and 
is classified as a too big to fail bank. This median bank has a market share of 
0.533%, offers a deposit interest rate of 0.307% and charges service commissions 
with a value of 0.261%. 
Table 1 is also presentes the summary statistics refered to the cost shifters 
instruments. The mean bank in the median year has a ratio of equity over assets 
of 11.888%, a capital adequacy ratio of 14.665%, a ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets of 73.308%, a ratio of loans to total assets of 63.674%, a ratio of labour costs, 
which include wages, to total assets of 1.19% and a ratio of operating costs to total 
deposits of 0.364%. 
4.6 Preliminary analysis of the impact of bank credit risk 
Analysing the average market share depending on the value of the 
dummy of credit risk, in other words, depending on whether the bank has a 
credit risk measure above the median or not, we have: 
Variable Mean Median Min Max St. dev.
Number of branches 884.763 360.000 1.000 6393.000 1470.542
Number of employees 26752.970 9946.000 6.000 231333.000 50753.400
Non-performing loans (%) 1.845 1.309 0.000 8.469 1.621
Bank credit risk (Y/N) 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.501
Too big to fail (Y/N) 0.746 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.436
Market share (%) 1.447 0.533 0.044 12.171 2.596
Deposit interest rate (%) 0.514 0.307 0.011 3.629 0.562
Service fees (Y/N) 0.811 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.392
Service fees (%) 0.257 0.261 0.000 0.845 0.236
Equity/Assets (%) 12.274 11.888 5.894 34.495 3.795
Capital adequacy ratio (%) 16.219 14.665 10.665 70.284 5.902
Liquid assets/Assets (%) 73.878 76.308 30.932 93.165 12.084
Loans/Assets (%) 57.004 63.674 0.296 97.184 21.101
Labour costs/Assets (%) 1.004 1.190 0.008 2.210 0.543
Operating costs/Deposits (%) 0.339 0.364 0.001 1.074 0.215
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Figure 2: Average market share depending on the value of the bank credit risk dummy. 
From the figure, it is concluded that banks that have a ratio of non-
performing loans above the median have higher market shares when compared 
with banks with a measure of credit risk below the median. In fact, at a first 
approach, it was expected that high credit risk was not desirable by depositants. 
However, this can be explained by an indirect effect of the deposit interest rate. 
Thus, higher credit risk can imply higher deposit interest rates, which attract 
































As previously explained, and following Berry (1994) approach, the MNL 
model and the NMNL demand model can be estimated by regressing the 
logarithm of observed market shares 𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗𝑡
∗ ) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑠0𝑡
∗ ) on prices, which include 
deposit interest rate and service fees, observed market characteristics, such as 
number of branches, number of employees and total assets, measure of bank 
credit risk and, in the NMNL case, the logarithm of the within group observed 
market share 𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗𝑡/𝑔
∗ ). 
Table 2 presents the estimation results. Specifications (i), (ii) and (iii) follow 
the MNL demand model and are estimated using OLS, while specifications (iv), 
(v) and (vi) are estimating using IV, specifically cost shifthers instruments. In 
addition to that, specifications (v) and (vi) correspond to the NMNL demand 
model. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticy and for correlation of 
errors within the same year. Throughout the various columns, different fixed 
effects were included, as refered at the bottom of each column. 
In all specifications, we considered the logarithm both of the deposit 
interest rate and service fees. This happened due to the fact that we found what 
that there was a non-linear relationship between these two price variables and 




Table 2: Estimation results. Note: The results were estimated using 338 observations. Clustered 
(by year) standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant 
at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%. 
5.1 OLS regressions 
The estimation results of the specification (i) indicate that depositants respond 
significantly to deposit interest rates, number of employees, number of branches 
and bank size when choosing a bank to allocate their deposits. Deposit interest 
rates have a negative impact on deposit demand, meaning that high interest rate 
will not attract depositants. Further, consumers value the number of employees, 
number of branches and bank size in a positive statistically significant way. 
Furthermore, depositants seem to do not consider whether the bank charge 
servicee fees or not in addition to their value. Bank credit risk is also not 
significantly taken into account in the decision-making process. In fact, the sign 
of the deposit interest rate coefficient is not consistent with what was expected 
because this interest rate should affect deposit demand in a positive way. This 
inconsistency may be caused by endogeneity problems. As explained before, 
Specifications
Explanatory variable OLS IV
    (i)    (ii)    (iii)     (iv)     (v)    (vi)
ln(Deposit interest rate) -0.119 -0.089 0.114 0.624 0.250 0.095
(0.027) *** (0.022) *** (0.057) * (0.108) *** (0.150) * (0.046) ***
ln(Service fees) 0.004 0.006 -0.020 -0.074 -0.158 -0.014
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) ** (0.076) (0.049) *** (0.024)
Service fees (Y/N) 0.081 0.065 -0.223 -1.295 -1.262 -0.183
(0.081) (0.085) (0.102) * (0.661) ** (0.566) ** (0.243)
Bank credit risk (Y/N) 0.025 0.081 0.084 0.185 0.130 0.027
(0.051) (0.047) (0.046) (0.077) *** (0.063) ** (0.026)
Number of branches 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) *** (0.000) ** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *
Number of employees 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) (0.000) *** (0.000)
Too big to fail (Y/N) 1.035 1.027 0.257 0.349 0.056
(0.023) *** (0.017) *** (0.033) *** (0.045) *** (0.029) ***
ln(sj/g) -0.002 0.813
(0.039) (0.081) ***
R-squared 0.866 0.870 0.981 0.957 0.966 0.999
Fixed effects Year Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year Year Year Year
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price variables are correlated with the error term and, therefore, estimation 
parameters are biased. 
In specification (ii) year fixed effects are included. Estimation results indicate 
the same conclusions as the ones from specification (i). With the introduction of 
year fixed effects, the mean valuation of bank unobserved characteristics for a 
given year are captured, reducing the endogeneity problems. This is evident by 
the reduction suffered by the value of the coefficient of deposit interest rate, 
which became less negative. 
By adding bank fixed effects in specification (iii) the unobserved bank 
component is also controled. With this feature, some changes in the estimation 
results occur. First, depositants do not respond to deposit interest rates anymore. 
Although this happens, consumers now value service fees when choosing a bank 
to allocate their deposits. They actually react in a negative way if banks charge 
service fees and respond negatively to high values of service commissions. These 
changes may be caused by the reduction of the correlation between prices and 
the error term, through the introduction of fixed effects. 
5.2 IV regressions 
Estimation results of specifications (iv), (v) and (vi) are of most interest to us as 
we use the IV method to fully solve the endogeneity problem. 
Instrumental variables are used in specification (iv) in order to face 
endogenous variables and its estimation results are quite interesting. In fact, 
depositants do respond to deposit interest rate in a positive way, as expected. In 
addition to that, they also value if banks charge or not service fees, but they do 
not react to their value. Thus, they prefer to allocate their deposits in banks that 
do not charge service commissions related with deposits. Besides that, bank 
credit risk is now taken in consideration. Consumers react to values above the 
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median in a positive way, which does not match previous expectations. The 
number of employees is not an important factor according to these results. 
Specifications (v) and (vi) apply the NMNL demand model using different 
group criteria. The first one, assume that banks are grouped according to their 
total assets into banks too big to fail and large banks. In this specification, the 
dummy that controls bank size is dropped in order to avoid collinearity issues. 
According to the results, depositants react to whether a bank charge service fees 
or not and to these commissions value in a negative way. While they continue to 
value bank credit risk above the median and the number of branches, they also 
respond positively to the number of employees. The estimation coefficient for the 
group segmentation parameter has a negative and insignificant value, meaning 
that the group variable does not fit well and, therefore, this segmentation 
criterion is not realistic. 
Specification (vi) divide the deposit decision-making process into single state 
and multi-state banks. In fact, this criterion seems to be realistic according to the 
results, as 𝜎, which is the coefficient of the logarithm of the within group market 
share, is significant and has a value between 0 and 1. This estimate is closer to 1, 
giving support that the correlation between the preferences of banks that belong 
to the same group is high. According to the estimation results, depositants react 
to deposit interest rate in a positive way as well as to the bank size. Number of 
branches are only significant at 10%. Following this specification, consumers do 
not value bank risk in a significant way, as expected. This specification is the most 
flexible because it follows the NMNL demand model, imposing less restrictive 





The purpose of this paper has been to analyse whether depositors respond 
to bank credit risk when they allocate their deposits in commercial banks through 
the estimation of a demand model for deposit services. The model is designed to 
reflect depositors decision-making process and includes a set of observed 
characteristics, such as deposit interest rate, service fees, number of branches, 
number of employees, bank size and bank credit risk. 
The results indicated that consumers do respond in a positive and 
statistically significant way to deposit interest rate and number of branches when 
concerns demand for deposits. In what regards bank credit risk, a statistically 
significant relationship between this varible and demand for deposits could not 
be taken. 
The results are limited to sample and data limitation. First, the characteristics 
of the sample can hinder the analysis. The defined relevant market includes 
approximately 50 banks per year, which is not representative. Furthermore, and 
from the summary statistics, the maximum ratio of non-performing loans is 
8.469% and the standard deviation 1.621%, revealing that observations are not 
very dispersed in what concerns this variable. This fact turns hard to find out 
realistic and consistent relationships on this variable. In addition to that, 
obtaining reliable data on US commercial banks variables was a difficult task. 
Besides that, data treatment was a very complex task in this thesis. On the other 
hand, due to some data limitation, several restrictive assumptions on economic 
definitions were made. 
For further research is highly reccommended to conciliate the economic 
definitions presented here, in what is related to the outside option and bank 
credit risk measures, with alternative approaches, so that new results can be 
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obtained. It would be interesting to analyse the relationship between bank credit 
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